The Battle of Influence between the E.U. and Russia

By Ioana Botea

The European Union is set to launch the “Eastern Partnership” on May 7 in Prague in an attempt to reach out to six countries of the former USSR – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – without offering them the prospect of accession. The treaty facilitates the movement of people to the E.U. and greater incentives for free trade. The Europeans decided to accelerate the implementation of the program in the aftermath of the war in Georgia in the summer of 2008.

The E.U. is steadily engaging in a struggle against Russia for influence at its periphery. It has sought to deploy in these areas its “soft power” by contrast to Russia, which has been eager to use a range of attack to assert its authority over what the Kremlin called in 2008 its “zone of privileged interests.” The "Eastern Partnership" is materializing in a moment where challenges have accumulated. With the exception of Azerbaijan which has large oil reserves, all countries have been hit very hard by the economic crisis. Ukraine’s GDP, the largest of the six countries, has been plummeting despite assistance from the IMF.

Political obstacles in the region have often been in favor of Russia. Echoes of the Georgian war are still perceivable, with a creeping annexation by Moscow of the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Ukraine, the gas crisis in January has aggravated political tensions, and allowed Moscow to slip in its men in the country's energy sector. In Moldova, the riots in Chisinau on April 7 have highlighted the vulnerability of the country in the face of Russian actions, and made dialogue with Europeans even more problematic.

Russia has denounced the "partnership" offered by the E.U. and described it as an intrusion into its natural sphere of influence. It continues to exerts enormous pressure on countries in its "near abroad" in order to obstruct the process. In Azerbaijan for example it is seeking preemption on all gas reserves.

The Europeans have responded by relaxing their demands vis-à-vis these regimes in which respect for democratic standards is inadequate (only two of them, Ukraine and Georgia, hold elections in standards acceptable to the European observers). The issue of values has been sidelined in favor of geopolitical interests. Belarus, an authoritarian state, has been invited into the partnership, provided that its president, Alexander Lukashenko, does not recognize the "independence" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as Russia has prompted him to do.

The institutional weakness of all the six states makes them vulnerable to Russian influence, who overtly exploits the risk of internal instability. Russia simultaneously flashes its military capacity and makes promises of financial support. Nevertheless, it seems that its ability to pull these countries is based more on intimidation than attraction.

The EU on the other hand suffers from internal divisions. Germany, propped up by France, wants to preserve a strategy of "engagement" with the Russian regime, in which confrontation remains sterile. Paris has also had major reservations regarding the "Eastern Partnership", seeing it as a competition with its project "Union for the Mediterranean” it is trying to promote. It is Poland and Sweden that proposed and pushed for a more coherent strategy towards the neighbors to the east.

A crucial actor that is missing from the discussion is the United States. The Obama administration has not yet developed a strategy for the Eastern European countries and the Caucasus. Instead, attempts to revive the bilateral relationship with Moscow have been focused around nuclear disarmament, Afghanistan and Iran. Russia is taking advantage of America’s detachment with the issue, and it is developing its "new security architecture” in Europe as a strategy for challenging the status quo on the continent. The power struggle has just begun.