Where to in Afghanistan?

By Fae MacArthur Clark

With the world's political leaders all gathering together in New York for the 61st session of the UN Assembly, President Obama looks set to have his plate full pushing the peace process with those who aren't that interested in talking and avoiding those that are. However, a nation whose ruler isn't going to be there is likely also garnering a good deal of Obama's attention.


Three weeks ago the media picked up on a new report coming out of Afghanistan calling for a new strategy there and last week the Washington Post got a hold of a copy of the confidential report. The report, the work of Obama's newly appointed leading General in Afghanistan, Stanley McChrystal, reads in no uncertain terms “failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible” and calls for more troops to be sent to the region. It is not, however, simply a call for more men and guns. McChrystal's report provides a detailed assessment of the status of the insurgency in Afghanistan and proposes a strategy more concerned with protecting civilians and training Afghani troops and police.


The report also pulls no punches in its critique of the Afghani government. “The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power-brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF's own errors, have given Afghans little reason to support their government” explains McChrystal. But what does this mean for the US?


In light of this summer's allegations of election fraud, this further indightment of the Afghani government, and the increasing unpopularity of the war at home, Obama may find it hard to justify extending the troops and resources General McChrystal requests. On the other hand, pulling out would likely raise accusations of cutting and running from a mess that we made and would leave the Afghani people largely unprotected in the face of a well organized Taliban. Finally, a compromise presents itself as perhaps the worst of the three options, likely leaving those US troops currently in Afghanistan in an increasingly dangerous position without achieving any of our goals there.


It seems, perhaps, that we are in a situation with only one real way forward and it isn't an appealing one. Cutting and running or continuing an ineffective presence, however, seem distinctly less favorable. Obama has shown some tacit support in the past for continued intervention in Afghanistan by stating he would not commit more troops and resources to Afghanistan without “absolute clarity about what the strategy is going to be.” But with a strategy, such as McChrystal's, perhaps that is what we are going to see.